Commentary – Loyal Van

Background history

In 1948, after gaining independence, Myanmar experienced internal instability, and between 1958 and 1960, the military temporarily governed the country in place of Prime Minister U Nu. Although an election was held in 1960, General Nay Win seized power in a coup in 1962.

A major incident occurred in 1988 that led to the ousting of the Nay Win government; however, the National Peace Building Organization, led by the military, immediately seized power. Elections were held again in 1990, where the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Su Kyi, won a landslide victory. However, the military did not recognize the results and placed Aung San Su Kyi under house arrest.

Starting from 1990, the military led by a single authoritarian ruler made only one change in the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services over a span of more than 30 years, until the coup d’état in 2021. This position was held exclusively by Senior General Than Shwe and Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. Senior General Than Shwe governed the country and the military for 19 years (from 1992 until March 2011). After that, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has been in charge for over 13 years (from 2011 to the present).

The National League for Democracy (NLD), which won the election in 1990, was denied power on the grounds that there was no constitution. Subsequently, Senior General Than Shwe convened a national convention and ratified a constitution that came into effect in 2008. In addition, on October 29, 1993, a social organization called the Union Solidarity and Development Association was established. Through this, the organization transformed itself into a political party in the 2010 general elections, changing from a military-led to a civilian-led entity, and achieved electoral victory.

From the above information, it can be seen that the military led by Senior General Than Shwe made systematic adjustments to transition from a constitutional framework and authoritarian regime to a democratic system over a period of 19 years.

The conflict between the military leaders and the civilian government

The military leader’s pre-planned democratic system has led to competition between President U Thein Sein’s government and the parliament led by U Shwe Mann, due to the involvement of the NLD in the 2013 interim elections, which has resulted in a political twist emerging within five years. Among these changes, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has built his power base, and at the age when he should retire, he seized state power in 2021 under the pretext of electoral fraud without stepping down. Although the Ministry of Defense’s directive No. 4/2014 states that one must retire at the age of 65, he continued to hold his position. (Senior General Min Aung Hlaing will turn 68 in 2024.) Furthermore, on July 31, 2024, the government summoned a national defense and security meeting, citing the current interim president U Myint Swe’s health condition and hospitalization, and once again took the interim presidency. Since taking power, the extension of the state of emergency pursuant to Article 425 of the 2008 constitution has occurred six times.

An attempt to hold a general election by the Military Junta

On February 1, 2021, the military seized power and extended the state of emergency for six months based on the 2008 Constitution. On August 1, 2021, six months after the power seizure, the military council restructured itself as the State Administration Council and General Min Aung Hlaing took on the role of Prime Minister. This extension has occurred six times so far. The military council is reportedly preparing for a census in October 2024 and intends to hold a general election in 2025, according to media outlets controlled by the military. The military council had previously attempted to hold elections in 2023, and this is not the first time this has happened. 

On September 29, 2024, 26 political parties issued a joint statement supporting the military council’s upcoming elections. Below is a list of the political parties that supported the elections organized by the military council.

1. Union Solidarity and Development Party
2. Myanmar People’s Democratic Party
3. New Democratic Party (Kachin)
4. National Unity Party
5. Rakhine State National Force Party
6. Lisu National Development Party (Du Lai Party)
7. Khami National Development Party
8. Akha National Development Party
9. National Political Alliances League Party
10. People’s Workers Party
11. Myanmar Peasant Development Party
12. Democratic Party
13. Democratic Forces Labor Party
14. Shan and Ethnic Democratic Party (Kyar Phyo Party)
15. Mro National Development Party
16. New National Democratic Party
17. National Interest Development Party
18. Khu Mee National Party
19. New National Political Vigor Party
20. Union Peace and Unity Party
21. Modern People’s Party
22. Labor Party
23. 88 Generation Students (Union of Myanmar) Party
24. Union of Myanmar National Political League Party
25. People’s party
26. Diversity and Peace Party

(https://www.facebook.com/chinaffairs/posts/189818017131272?rdid=sQvK1gYLfATNuI6x – The effort of the military council to hold elections in 2023 as presented by the ICA)

Impact of the Military Junta’s Elections on Chin State

Among the 19 towns within Chin State, 12 towns are under the control of local resistance groups, leaving only 7 towns where the military junta has the opportunity to hold elections. However, due to the increased involvement of the local population and the strengthening of local resistance groups, analysts suggest that significant political and military changes may emerge in Chin State by the year 2025.

Regarding the military junta’s plan to gather the census data, a political analyst was asked about its potential impact on Chin State. The analyst indicated that the military junta would likely be unable to collect census data in Chin State, and that presenting a census without proper control over even the major cities in Chin State would only result in a misleading or fraudulent census.

In response to further inquiries regarding the elections that the military junta plans to hold, it was reiterated that while political changes might occur due to the elections, they will be based on local political organizations rather than local revolutionary forces. “The main point I want to emphasize is that there are still opportunists among us, Chins who have not yet been tainted by politics. The potential for conflicts between these individuals and local revolutionary organizations has significantly increased. With those conflicts, changes may occur as well,” he stated to the ICA.

Additionally, when asked about a leader of the Chin Revolutionary Movement, he firmly stated, “If local revolutionary forces in Chin State are opposed, I don’t believe there will be any chance for the elections or the electoral list to succeed. I think there is no possibility for an election led by the military junta to take place in Chin State.” He further commented on how the political complexities within the state could relate to the elections that the military junta would conduct, indicating that such political turmoil is not only present in Chin State but persists throughout the country, whether elections occur or not. He expressed that the turmoil would continue. The political complexities within the state could be manipulated by groups aligned with the military junta, suggesting whether it could keep control or erupt, likening it to something “that could rise to the surface like a bubble, and whether it could be maintained.” He remarked that the ‘thieves of power’ are shameless; however, if they act with pretense and try to cover up, skirmishes are likely to continue.” He did not respond to the question of whether revolutionary groups quietly collaborating with the military junta exist in Chin State.

However, when asked about the leader of the Chin Spring Revolution, despite the political turmoil within Chin State, they stated that it would not be possible to support and implement the military junta’s elections.

Due to the impacts of armed conflict as well as social and economic damages in Chin State, the perceptions of the Chin people are as follows: “The political awareness among the people is still very low. However, their views are quite strong. If a leader with a rich understanding of politics and a vision for the future emerges and can guide them decisively, the politics of Chin State could become something to be proud of.” This was stated by a political analyst.

In Chin State, 12 towns are now under the control of local resistance forces, with 9 districts and 19 towns in the region. The remaining 7 towns are still under the control of the military junta. Locals report that voter registration can only take place in certain neighborhoods of towns like Hakha, Falam, and Tedim. The towns that remain under military control include Hakha, Falam, Tedim, Kanpetlet, Mindat, Thantlang, and Khaikam.